Partition policy deepened by Covid 19

Esra Aygin

It is a source of concern not only for the communities on the island, but also for the international community that there is no consultation, plan or discussion regarding the opening of the crossing points, which have been closed supposedly due to the Covid 19 pandemic. 

Last week, the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces on the island stated that it stands ready to assist the sides on the lifting of the restrictions at the crossing points. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, in response to a letter by Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci said that he expects the two leaders to agree on certain arrangements on the opening of the crossing points as soon as the health situation is stabilized. The European Commission, which has called on the opening of all borders in Europe, is also watching closely the policies of the sides regarding the crossing points. 

The Greek Cypriot side, on 28 February, when not a single Covid 19 case had yet been detected, unilaterally closed four of the nine crossing points in Cyprus. The fact that the other five crossing points remained open, that there were no other travel restrictions, that there were no measures at airports and seaports, and the fact that the Limassol Carnival was allowed to go on on 1 March made it impossible to justify or defend the legitimacy of the closure of the four crossing points. 

A couple of days later, the Turkish Cypriot side, ignoring calls from peace activists and reasonable politicians for cooperation and coordination, unilaterally closed all of the crossing points. 

In fact, the Covid 19 pandemic provided a very convenient excuse for those, who want the crossing points closed. At the moment, although many restrictions are being eased, there is no plan, cooperation or coordination for the opening of the crossing points. The policy being implemented at the moment on both sides of the island is the policy of those, who do not want the crossing points to open, and who prefer the situation to stay like this. The Covid 19 crisis is being used to deepen the division of the island. 

The signals of this policy were rife in the Greek Cypriot side even before the Covid 19 pandemic. Since the end of last year, there has been an intensive propaganda that a high number of refugees are crossing from the north the south. Official data regarding the immigrants were not shared, but it was argued that Turkey is deliberately sending immigrants to the south and that their numbers are constantly increasing. Some opinion leaders, politicians and political parties were demanding to close the crossing points as a response. 

According to figures by civil society organisations and independent researchers however, there had been a steady decrease in the number of immigrants crossing from the north to the south since December 2019. Nevertheless, a number of Greek Cypriot ministers adopted ELAM’s proposal to close the crossing points and seriously discussed the issue with Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades.  

At the moment, there are health experts and politicians, who appear frequently on TV arguing that the figures from the north cannot be trusted, that there are uncontrolled entries continuously from Turkey to the north, and that under these circumstances it is impossible to open the crossing points. 

There are even some, who argue that crossing points are the reason why there is no solution on the island, that crossing points legitimise and normalise the situation on the island and prevent a solution, and therefore, they should remain closed. 

Another opinion is to keep the crossing points closed and destroy the north economically, therefore rendering it weak in negotiations. Among all these absurd arguments and voices, calls to open the crossing points remain very weak. 

The Greek Cypriot side, in response to calls to open the crossing points, is saying that they closed crossing points except two, and it is the Turkish Cypriot side that closed all the crossing points. However, the 14-day quarantine requirement means that in practice all the crossing points are closed. The Turkish Cypriot side could easily expose the Greek Cypriot side by declaring all crossing points open, but for some reason the north, which economically needs the people coming from the south does not seem to be in a hurry to open the crossing points either. Interestingly, there seems to be a tacit agreement between the two sides to keep the crossing points closed. This situation strengthens the right wing narrative and puts important issues such as confidence building measures or the resumption of negotiations in the back burner. 

In fact, this situation is an excellent public opinion exercise for Anastasiades, who, by now, is widely known to have permanent partition in his heart. It is a test of ‘what would happen?’ in a situation where there are no negotiations, all crossing points are closed and the north is sealed. The Green Line has turned into a border for months. A normalized border. And sadly, there is no significant reaction from the public. 

As it can be seen from the statements, the international community is not hiding that it is concerned that the issue of opening the crossing points will be abused for political reasons. It is indeed worrying that there is no plan to open the crossing points at a time when the virus has been brought under control on both sides. In the north there has been no new Covid 19 case for weeks. In the south, only a few cases are detected each day and these are probably people, who were in contact with positive cases. In other words, there is no pandemic in Cyprus that would legitimise the policy of keeping crossing points closed. 

Unfortunately, with the way the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot authorities reacted to the Covid 19 crisis, they both physically and politically deepened the division. It is obvious that there is need for a strong and coordinated pressure from the communities to have the crossing points opened again. 

Greek Cypriots seem blithely unaware of risks in a non-solution

As the deadlock in Cyprus negotiations continues, much is being said and written about the possible impacts of a non-solution on Turkish Cypriots and the northern part of Cyprus.

The most realistic scenario is that the rapid demographic, social, religious, cultural, economic and political alteration of the north will continue. In time, this will effectively turn the area into a Turkish province.

Little is said, however, about the possible impact of a non-solution on the Republic of Cyprus. There is almost the sense that the southern part of the island is enclosed in a protected, isolated, safe bubble and will remain unaffected by a Turkified north, an increasingly assertive Turkey, changing regional dynamics and instability.

This assumption is unrealistic and worrying but has gained so much ground that it is now commonplace to hear Greek Cypriot officials talk about a federal solution as an “unnecessary risk” that would expose the whole of Cyprus to Turkey’s influence, or even control. They seem to believe that without a solution the Republic would be able to go about its business as usual, exploit the hydrocarbons, maintain a robust economy and stay safe.

“The Cyprus problem is like a snowball,” said professor Ahmet Sozen of political science and international relations. “As time passes, the snowball continues to grow. Multiple layers of additional conflicts are added on to it. It will get bigger, more complex and more destructive each day without a solution. And when it hits, it won’t just be the Turkish Cypriots who will be crushed.”

The demographic, social, religious, cultural, economic and political alteration in the north will totally change the dynamics of the Cyprus problem. Before long, Greek Cypriots will become neighbours with a completely different, religious, conservative and nationalist population. Turkish Cypriots will not be at the negotiation table, and at this speed of land development in the hands of Turkish capital, there will soon be no land to return. The porous 180 km buffer zone will effectively turn into a land border with Turkey.

Since there are no effective checks on who enters the northern part of Cyprus from Turkey, the buffer zone will become even more compromised. As well as posing a security threat, this will also reinforce nationalist and racist sentiments among the Greek Cypriot community.

The current false sense of security in Cyprus arises from feeble conditions of ceasefire. There is no ceasefire agreement, but only ceasefire lines delineated by the UN and not recognised by the sides. The buffer zone is lined with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and M-60 machine guns among others. And if Unficyp is withdrawn, the Greek Cypriot National Guard will be directly faced with the Turkish military along the Green Line.

There are also too many uncertainties outside Cyprus, in Turkey and in the region. What will happen in Cyprus for example, which is home to tens of thousands of Turkish troops, if there is another military coup or an escalation of tension in Turkey? What about possible tensions in the waters around Cyprus?

Our immediate neighbourhood is a daily example that things are safe and stable until one day they are not anymore.

“International and regional realities are changing in unprecedented ways and at an unprecedented speed and we cannot realistically expect not to be affected,” said Harry Tzimitras, who is the director of Peace Research Institute Olso (PRIO) Cyprus Centre. “The current status quo does not seem to be sustainable. Nothing should be taken for granted… The framework within which the Cyprus problem exists is seriously changing and this can have grave consequences.”

In the absence of a solution, another imminent risk for Cyprus as a whole will be tensions around the hydrocarbon exploration activities. While the Republic is adamantly continuing with its exploration programme, Turkey, which appears to be taking an increasingly assertive position, is determined not to allow the Greek Cypriots to unilaterally exploit hydrocarbon reserves unless and until there is a solution on the island.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently warned against any step in Cyprus in contravention of Turkey.

“Those in the region, who are trying to ignore us, should know very well that they are putting their own existence at risk,” he said. “Those who, instead of choosing to win altogether, resort to actions that will lead to crises or even clashes, will have to first answer to their own people.”

In February, Turkish naval forces prevented Italian energy giant ENI’s drillship from reaching its target in the Cypriot EEZ. The standoff lasted two weeks and ENI’s drillship withdrew.

The consortium ExxonMobil-Qatar Petroleum is scheduled to start drilling in Cypriot waters in mid-November. In response, Turkey has said it will also drill in the Mediterranean. Further drillings by ENI are planned for the near future. There are unconfirmed reports that Turkey will set a platform in ENI’s block.

Israel and Egypt, with whom Cyprus has signed cooperation agreements for the exploitation of hydrocarbons, have started talking about the military option. Israeli ambassador to Cyprus Sammy Ravel recently said he hoped “military force would not be necessary against Turkish provocations,” while the Egyptian ambassador Mai Taha Mohammed Khalil said: “We hope we don’t reach the point where we will have to use the military.”

Needless to say, any tension in or around Cyprus is bound to hit the economy hard.

“Tourism, which is a fundamental pillar to the Cypriot economy, is very sensitive to security and stability. In a volatile region with many challenges, Cyprus can best aspire to prosper in the future if security risks are minimised allowing for a stable and strong economy,” said Tzimitras. “A solution to the Cyprus problem would certainly facilitate this.”

We have to understand that the choice we have in Cyprus is not between either an insulated, safe, Hellenic state in the southern part of the island or a federal solution with the Turkish Cypriots. The choice is between either a small, divided, vulnerable country with a porous hard border, an unpredictable Turkey, tensions around hydrocarbon exploration activities and an unstable economy or a united, federal EU member state.

The absence of realism has been the mother of all evils in Cyprus. I hope it does not yet again lead our small island into disaster.

https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/10/07/greek-cypriots-seem-blithely-unaware-of-risks-in-a-non-solution/ 

Permanent partition is in sight

Esra  Aygin

During the course of 2017, Cyprus got closer than ever to being unified. Despite having made unprecedented progress in almost all issues, prepared maps of territorial adjustments, and opened the security and guarantee system to negotiation for the first time in history, Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders failed to take the final step and reach a settlement.

To the astonishment of the international community, in the early hours of 7 July 2017, the parties left the negotiation table at Crans Montana, Switzerland and walked away from the best and probably last chance to unify Cyprus.

As UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres later wrote in his report, this was not due to a lack of understanding over the substance, but a lack of trust and determination. Unfortunately fear and short-term political agendas won over vision in Crans-Montana and now Cyprus stands closer than ever to be permanently divided.

The collapse of talks has empowered the pro-partition forces on both sides of the island. While right-wing nationalists on the Turkish Cypriot side are advocating an independent or semi-independent state, Greek Cypriot nationalists are talking about federalism as an unnecessary risk that would put Cyprus in permanent danger by enabling Turkey to have impact in its daily affairs. Although no Greek Cypriot political party or politician has spoken publicly in favour of a partition, the option of a velvet divorce has entered public discourse. Moreover, elements across the divide with vested interest in the continuation of status quo have been active in promoting separation.

A number of reciprocal provocative steps on both sides of the divide, such as imposing customs duties on humanitarian aid delivered to Greek Cypriots and Maronites and limiting religious services in the churches in the north, ceasing the activities of bi-communal committees, and denying entry at Cyprus airports of non-EU tourists planning to stay in the hotels in the north, are poisoning the public sentiment and damaging any remaining prospect of solution. 

The UN Secretary General has been very clear about the conditions of supporting another effort in Cyprus. He stated that there should be joint determination and willingness by the sides to take up the core issues in a package approach with the aim of reaching a strategic agreement. However, instead of paving the way for a successful return to negotiations, both sides have been setting preconditions that are likely to discourage the UN from taking any initiative.

Moreover, any positive outcome in Cyprus would depend also on Turkey and Greece and their broader Greco-Turkish relations. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan faces challenging parliamentary and presidential elections in November 2019 after his narrow victory in a referendum on a new constitution in April 2017, which abolished the role of prime minister and gave extensive powers to the presidency. Therefore, it is questionable if Ankara would be willing to make a move on Cyprus before the knife-edge elections.

Meanwhile, the demographic change that is altering the composition of the Turkish Cypriot community, mushrooming hotels and casinos in the hands of Turkish capital, increasing socio-cultural and religious pressure, increased dependence on Ankara, and direct involvement in education, civil society and media through the Turkish embassy in Nicosia, will alter the conditions in the north in such a way that federation will ultimately practically not be possible in the near future.

As the north will be absorbed demographically, economically, socially and politically, the progressive Turkish Cypriots seeking unification will grow weaker, whilst those seeking partition will grow stronger.

The only way to reverse the trend toward permanent partition is to erode the status quo by actively promoting dialogue, empathy and understanding between the communities; encouraging economic cooperation and interdependence; and establishing a sense of partnership and coexistence in every field of life, so that the conditions are created for the people to demand solution from their leaders.

We will either let go of our fetish of a comprehensive solution and embrace a very active evolutionary approach towards a federal solution or we will sail in uncharted waters until partition is finalized.

Interview with Hugh Pope, the Turkey/Cyprus Project Director of the International Crisis Group (Published in Turkish in Havadis Newspaper on 13 April 2014)

Hugh Pope - International Crisis Group

Interview by Esra Aygin

Was there a particular experience or experiences that convinced you that partition could be a better option for Cyprus?

Pope: No. Partition is not the “better option” – it is an imperfect situation that is unfortunately the reality today. If you look at the titles of our earlier reports (“the drift towards partition”, “reunification or partition”), we were not in favour of the idea but judged non-negotiated partition was becoming inevitable if a federal settlement was not reached in the 2008-2012 process. What we are now saying is that if Cyprus is going to end up with partition anyway, it would be far better to have a negotiated partition than the current status quo.

The International Crisis Group has advocated a federal solution in Cyprus for many years. What made you change your mind almost suddenly and argue that federation is not suitable for Cyprus?

Pope: International Crisis Group has published seven reports on Cyprus since 2006, all in support of a federal settlement; this is the eighth. We are still supporting a federal settlement if the two sides can actually reach a deal, but in the meantime we are urging them to see if there is another possible settlement they could both live with.

This change was not sudden. We started looking into ways forward when the 2008-2012 process broke down, and, as we spoke to all sides in Nicosia, Ankara, Athens, Brussels, London and Washington, we gradually came to the conclusion that a sixth round of talks on exactly the same basis was going to produce the same failed result. The reasons are many and fully explained in the report, but just a few examples would be: the lack of a common language or any real bilingualism, the complete lack of infrastructure integration and the lack of any sign that open front lines since 2003 had brought any knitting back together of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Why partition and not a unitary state then, if we are talking about alternatives?

Pope: Indeed, a unitary state is a possible option, and would certainly have strong support from the Greek Cypriot side. But the differences and suspicions between the two communities seem too great to make it seem feasible. Polls show 40 per cent of Turkish Cypriots may be able to accept it or find it tolerable, but the reality is that 60 per cent reject it entirely. They voted in a leader in 2010 who makes no secret of his preference for a two-state option. They and Turkey would certainly insist on powerful guarantees if this route to a settlement was to be chosen, and this is something that Greek Cypriots would not want to accept. It also strongly goes against the realities on the ground -- imperfect as they may be -- over the past four decades.

Do you really believe that the Turkish Cypriots are living under desirable conditions and that the status quo is ‘peaceful and viable’ as you state in your report?

Pope: No, not at all! That’s one of the reasons we have written eight reports trying to find ways to a settlement. The first thing that most Turkish Cypriots say to me is that they want an end to the uncertainty, and that they want to live in a normal country. The status quo is peaceful and viable – as long as Turkey is ready to pay for it, and Turkish Cypriots are ready to continue becoming more and more like Anatolia – but it is a sub-optimal situation for both Turkey, Greece, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.

Your report comes at a time of a high level of determination by the two sides on the island to reach a federal solution and almost an unprecedented international interest and support for the process. Don’t you think your report is completely contrary to the present atmosphere, and process that seems so promising?

Pope: No. This is the sixth major round of talks in five decades on a bizonal, bicommunal federation, and the atmosphere seems even less promising than in 2008-12 or 2002-2004. Officials on all sides tell us they are “hearing nothing new”. The international interest is relatively subdued and certainly not unprecedented. The U.S. has shown a new interest, possibly due to a combination of the Israeli connection, the idea of promoting peace in the east Mediterranean and to help a U.S. company involved in natural gas exploration. But Washington has not appointed a special envoy.

The presence of a pragmatic Greek Cypriot leader is very helpful, but we must remember that the banking crisis has gravely weakened him.

The crosstalks with Mr. Mavroyiannis going to Ankara and Mr. Ozersay going to Athens were very positive, an idea that Crisis Group has actively supported since February 2011, and it could be the beginning of something very important. But there is no sign yet that this is going to become the regular exchange that it should.

Your report mentions that negotiations have been carried out for decades for a federal solution. However, the Turkish side, until the early 2000s advocated a confederal solution. Don’t you think we should give more chance to the negotiations aimed at a federation?

Pope: A federation has been the goal of five rounds of talks over four decades – thousands of meetings, every combination of negotiators, all kinds of settings -- how much more of a chance can it be given?

There are basically two kinds of federation that are talked about: there is the bizonal, bicommunal federation (i.e. a variety of Belgium), the ‘normal’ federation which has not worked out for Cyprus for the reasons outlined above. Then there is a confederation, or a “light federation”, which sometimes seems to be what the government of Nicos Anastasiades may be aiming for, and what Turkey and Turkish Cypriots have aimed for in the past (when not seeking an independent Turkish Cypriot state). The light federation or confederal systems seem to mean roughly the same thing. The problem with them is that no other example exists anywhere in the world (the Swiss one is really a federation), and it is almost impossible to imagine how a “light” federation can work if the state has to act as a united entity in the EU. Any Cypriot government will be obliged to deliver a united implementation of EU regulations country-wide, necessitating multiple levels of government that will inevitably need to include the cumbersome, heavy checks and balances of the “Convergences” of the 2008-12 process, or the Annan Plan.

Don’t you think an independent Turkish Cypriot state would be a big injustice in that it would legitimise the status quo?

Pope: Yes, in a way, but everything is relative. The prolongation of the current situation – non-negotiated partition, occupation of 37 per cent of the island, very little property compensated for, disputes that are casting a shadow over natural gas development south of the island, and tens of thousands of Turkish troops on the island – is clearly far more unfair on Greek Cypriots than what we suggest be discussed: a negotiated peace settlement, 29 per cent or less of the island as Turkish Cypriot, all the property compensated for in some way, a clear division of territorial waters that leave Greek Cypriots free to exploit whatever gas they can find and all Turkish troops off the island.

Do you believe that a Turkish Cypriot state could truly be independent of the influence of Turkey?

Pope: Geography dictates that both sides of Cyprus will be strongly influenced by Turkey after any settlement, and of course Turkish Cypriots will probably want to continue to have special relations with Turkey. But a Turkish Cypriot state within the EU would finally have alternatives to Turkey, that would allow it to start to grow with other partners and stand on its own feet. Many of those partners would actually be Greek Cypriot. A Turkish Cypriot state within the EU would actually mean that the two sides of the island would have the same currency, overall regulations, visa regime, and, in due course, a border that would be as invisible as the border between normal EU states.

Prof. Dr. Niyazi Kızılyürek, in his article published in Yenidüzen newspaper on 23 March, wrote that your report is either aimed at getting the Greek Cypriots support a federation by threatening them with partition; or at showing the Greek Cypriot side that the things it would gain in return for an independent Turkish Cypriot state are very attractive and therefore helping put into practice the Turkish thesis of partition… What was your intention in publishing this report?

Pope: Prof. Kizilyurek makes an accurate list of the proposals in the Crisis Group report but I disagree with the reasons with which he concludes that it is “faulty” [kusurlu]. He believes that consciously or unconsciously that we are simply enacting a Turkish nationalist thesis, namely partition [taksim], Turkey’s Plan B. In fact, the Turkish nationalist Plan B is the reality today – non-negotiated partition, exposure of the island to an unrestricted monopoly of Turkish predatory capitalism and dependence on Turkish subsidies. In fact it is not International Crisis Gropu proposal, but this current Plan B which is leading, as Prof. Kizilyurek fears, to the gradual evolution of north Cyprus into a Gibraltar.

What we are proposing is much more of a Plan C. Prof. Kizilyurek seems to dismiss the possibility that the EU will accept a Turkish Cypriot state. Our research shows that there is no way that the EU can say no to this, if the Greek Cypriot side accepts it. The question is much more, what can persuade the Greek Cypriots to do take such a step? First of all, trust in Turkey, which will take a great deal of effort on Turkey’s part, plus a withdrawal of troops, an end to the guarantees, proper compensation for property and so on – all things that I have never ever heard proposed in the “Turkish nationalist thesis” [Turk milliyetci tezi].

Surely, the tearing apart of Cypriot society in 1963 and 1974 is morally repugnant, but it happened. This is why International Crisis Group refers to the present reality as imperfect. Unfortunately, as our report points out, this division is indeed a reality. And our proposal is a suggestion of how it might be dealt with.

On the other hand, as Prof. Kizilyurek points out, once it starts being seriously discussed, then the two sides may discover it is harder to split the island than to reunite it. That knowledge might then make it easier for the leaders to return in good faith to the idea of a federation, or reunification as equal citizens without any of the outdated ideas of people either being “Greek Cypriot” or “Turkish Cypriot”.

You are also being criticised for misinterpreting SeeD/Cyprus 2015 polls. “It is misleading to claim that the communities oppose a compromise federal settlement model. Our polls demonstrate remarkable level of support for the compromise model despite decades of disappointment,” said SeeD/Cyprus 2015 in a statement last week. How would you respond to this criticism?

Pope: It’s true that the SeeD/Cyprus 2015 polls find that a federation is acceptable as the second best choice for both communities.  But when you break down what people really want, support for the compromises needed in a bizonal, bicommunal are hard to find. As the Crisis Group reports from the poll results in footnote 25:

Turkish Cypriots see a consensual separation with both states in the EU as the ideal outcome (79 per cent) and better than the Turkish Cypriot interpretation of federation (69 per cent), while interim solutions such as Taiwanisation or Kosovoisation are rejected as half measures (50 per cent and 46 per cent respectively). Greek Cypriots see consensual separation as entirely unacceptable (79 per cent), but do not support key stated goals of the talks: political equality (32 per cent), a federal government (31 per cent), bizonality (19 per cent), bicommunality (18 per cent), and equal constituent states (15 per cent). As for both communities sharing power, 58 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 54 per cent of Turkish Cypriots are opposed.

Your report seems to be ignoring the financial crisis in the south. Don’t you think that this crisis made people more supportive of a federal solution?

Pope: A wish for a settlement is different from a wish for a federal solution. I’ve seen no polling data that indicates that Greek Cypriots are suddenly warmer to a federation. But the financial crisis has however certainly made Greek Cypriots much keener on some kind of settlement, which as the report points out will be a far surer provider of economic health than, say, natural gas. On page 17 we state:

“One reason for the new thinking is the collapse of the economy since the crushing banking crisis of March 2013 and a slow realisation that Cyprus urgently needs to reinvent itself. Some Greek Cypriots even believe that the EU’s crippling bailout terms were a plot to force them to surrender cherished hopes of reunification. President Anastasiades shares a wide recognition that a settlement is vital for restoring economic health. Outsiders judge him to be acting on a realisation that the self- contained, uncompromising Greek Cypriot “castle” of international legitimacy and support has been undermined.”