Akinci: A lone fighter who won't give up

By Esra Aygin

ONLY two years after the devastation and division of 1974, when nobody could dare dream of it, the 28-year-old Mustafa Akinci imagined a single, united Nicosia.

In the 14 years he served as the Turkish Cypriot mayor of the divided capital from 1976 to 1990, he pioneered cooperation with his Greek Cypriot counterpart Lellos Demetriades to develop a common Nicosia Master Plan and common infrastructure works reuniting the city.

The future Turkish Cypriot leader was a solid social democrat and a strong believer that Cyprus should be united.

“He had to fight for what he did in Nicosia as a mayor,” says Akinci’s long-time friend and confidant, journalist Hasan Kahvecioglu. “The war had just ended and the majority was psychologically not ready for cooperation with Greek Cypriots. Society excluded him. He was branded a traitor. The then-Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash ostracised him and cut the allowance to the municipality. But he faced up to all and reunited Nicosia in terms of infrastructure and heritage.”

Akinci is stubborn and knows how it is to fight alone. Today, Akinci, who was widely seen as the best chance for the solution of the Cyprus problem, finds himself fighting alone once again.

During the recent visit by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu to the island, the longstanding disagreement between Akinci and Ankara over the nature of a settlement could not have been made clearer.

“Some people in north Cyprus keep on saying, ‘According to my ideology federation is the best’ and dictate what should happen,” said Cavusoglu, referring to Akinci. “The Cyprus issue is too grand to be sacrificed to someone’s political ideologies or political ambitions.”

“Of course nobody can single-handedly dictate the solution model for Cyprus,” Akinci snapped back. “But this rule is valid for everyone.”

The only reason Akinci ran in the 2015 elections was to solve the Cyprus problem through a federal solution, says Kahvecioglu.

Akinci showed Ankara he would not yield to bullying when, only a day after he was elected, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attacked him for calling for “brotherly relations” with Turkey rather than one of a “mother” and her “baby”. Erdogan warned Akinci to watch what he said and not forget that Ankara financed the Turkish Cypriots.

“I am behind everything I have said,” responded Akinci on live Turkish TV. “Not only I know what I say, I say it with my conscience, my heart and my mind.”

“He is very honest and direct,” says Kahvecioglu. “And he expects people around him to be the same.”

Throughout the negotiations, Akinci had to tread the very thin line between being flexible, compromising and courageous to take the necessary steps to reach an agreement with his Greek Cypriots counterpart, but at the same time, convincing Turkey and keeping it on board. Contrary to popular belief, the communication between Akinci and Ankara was not a one-way channel where Ankara dictated and Akinci delivered.

“There were harsh, hours-long bargains behind closed doors with President Erdogan especially in the territory and guarantees topics,” explains Kahvecioglu. “He even threatened a couple of times to leave the negotiation table if Ankara would stick to maximalist positions.”

In doing this, Akinci fully believed that Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades would stand by him and that they would walk together until the end, according to Kahvecioglu. “He believed that they both knew where they were going and wanted to go there.”

On more than one occasion during the negotiations, Akinci took steps despite Ankara’s reservations, even objections.

“The first fight with Ankara was at Mont Pelerin [November 2016] when Akinci said he was ready to increase the percentage of area that would be returned to the future Greek Cypriot constituent state,” said Kahvecioglu. “Anastasiades didn’t reciprocate and asked for a recess. Then in Geneva, when he gave a map before securing a rotating presidency, just before Greece disrupted the conference.”

These were irreversible tactical mistakes in the negotiations according to Ankara. When such compromises did not lead to a successful result, Akinci was left exposed.

“Akinci is being reminded at every opportunity that he showed his cards too soon, that Anastasiades didn’t reciprocate,” says Kahvecioglu. “Erdogan is displeased that Akinci acted independently. And Erdogan’s displeasure is behind today’s crises.”

Since a solution in Cyprus is not possible without Ankara’s contribution and consent, why didn’t he manage these sensitive relations better?

“Akinci puts a lot of faith in people he trusts,” stresses Kahvecioglu. “He trusted Anastasiades a lot. He first and foremost saw him as a friend, and then a political counterpart. He trusted that they could overcome any political differences through their friendship.”

Akinci’s absolute trust in Anastasiades could even be seen as political naivete.

“Akinci should have been conscious of the fact that there is a politician opposite him,” says peace activist Okan Dagli. “He should have foreseen that certain political calculations, interests, ambitions may alter Anastasiades’ priorities. For Akinci, federal solution was the absolute priority and he believed this was also the case for Anastasiades. His good faith and trust got ahead of political foresight.”

Although a series of disappointments throughout the process disheartened Akinci, he still believed that things could work out in Crans-Montana in July 2017 when all the international actors would come together, encourage the sides and help formulate mutually acceptable solutions to outstanding issues.

The failure was devastating for an overemotional Akinci, which manifested itself in his final statement at Crans-Montana: “This was the last effort by our generation. We failed.”

“He was without hope. He could not see the way ahead,” says Kahvecioglu to explain why Akinci made such a dramatic statement. “And later he probably regretted having ever said that.”

Akinci retreated into silence and withdrew from everyone, even his supporters for months after the failure in Crans-Montana.

According to Kahvecioglu, the reason for his resentment was not just the failure to reach a solution but also the loss of a friend: Anastasiades.

“If Mustafa Akinci is disappointed and hurt, it is because his personal relationship has also been destroyed,” says Kahvecioglu. “He cannot come to terms with the fact that personal friendships can be destroyed because of political reasons.”

But the lone fighter is not willing to give up easily. “Not because he is a romantic or a dreamer,” says Kahvecioglu. “But because he truly believes this is the best future for both communities in Cyprus. And he will stand up for this till the end.”

“At the moment, it is not Akinci personally, who is being disrespected and attacked by Ankara,” explains Dagli. “It is the Turkish Cypriot community, 60 per cent of which elected him for a five-year term for his vision of a united, federal Cyprus.”

With an Ankara that is clearly trying to steer the process away from a federation and an uninterested, even disruptive Greek Cypriot leader, he has to be ever more adamant and creative if he is to succeed, Dagli adds.

https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/02/03/akinci-a-lone-fighter-who-wont-give-up/

The way is clear if there is will

ESRA AYGIN

Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades, who was recently reelected in the presidential elections in the southern part of the island, and Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci are expected to meet soon. During this meeting, the two leaders will have to assess whether there is a possibility to revive the talks that failed in July, and discuss what kind of a roadmap a possible new process should follow.

Provided that both sides have the will to return to a results-oriented negotiation process, the way forward is actually very clear.

Guterres framework should be formally confirmed

On 30 June 2017 in Crans Montana, United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres tabled a document for the simultaneous resolution of the outstanding core issues across the six chapters of the negotiations.

This document, which came to be called the “Guterres framework”, eliminates extreme positions on highly sensitive issues – territory, political equality, property, equivalent treatment, and security and guarantees - which the sides saved for the ‘big give-and-take’ at the end.

Although both leaders have said they accept it, they must now formally confirm the Guterres framework and make it public as a joint statement. This would preserve the agreements and convergences reached until now, provide a solid basis for the resumption of negotiations, and serve as a concrete roadmap for the process.

Such a step would also encourage the UN, which is looking for a clear determination on both sides before it decides to assist another process.

A strategic agreement

As UN Secretary General highlights in his report dated 28 September 2017, he wants the two leaders to return to the table not for random negotiations, but to reach a strategic agreement that will serve as a basis for a comprehensive solution. The Guterres framework contains the elements of this strategic agreement. After confirming the framework, the two leaders can discuss the elements included in it with a package approach, resolve them simultaneously and reach a strategic agreement.

As a matter of fact, the Secretary General says that the two leaders were very close to reaching this strategic agreement that is basically the essence of a comprehensive solution in Crans-Montana, and states that the UN is ready “to assist the sides, should they jointly decide to engage in such a process with the necessary political will, in order to conclude the strategic agreement that was emerging in Crans-Montana.”

According to the Secretary General, “an early agreement at the strategic level would immediately provide each side with the needed reassurance that the overall settlement would contain those elements that are of key importance for each community and thus provide impetus for completion of the remaining technical details.”

As the Secretary General points out, the details may be concluded at a technical level after an agreement at the strategic level within the Guterres framework.

UNSG will make the final decision

Inarguably, the resumption of such a process, and the conclusion of an agreement in line with the Secretary General’s suggestions, depends entirely on the sincere will of the two leaders.

The Secretary General points to this fact by writing in his report:

“Even if all the core enablers are in place, as they appeared to be in Crans-Montana in late June, I am convinced that the prospects of finally pushing this process over the finishing line will remain elusive without the strongest of political will, courage and determination, mutual trust and a readiness on the part of all parties to take calculated risks in the last and most difficult mile of the negotiations.”

Exactly for this reason, UN’s support to a new process is conditional to the determination of the two leaders. Through his representatives here, the UN Secretary General, is currently closely following everything that is said, done, and not done by the sides. He will make a decision on the viability of a new process in the near future. Although there is no timeframe for this decision, signs are that the UN Security Council is determined to scale back the UNFICYP and UN Good Offices presence in Cyprus in July 2018 if prospects for a resumption have not emerged by then.  

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Guterres Framework

Territory

Need to adjust the map presented by the Turkish Cypriots to respond to concerns expressed by Greek Cypriots regarding some locations.

Political equality

Rotating Presidency with 2:1 ratio

Decision-making (effective participation): simple majority with one positive vote with deadlock resolving mechanism/ in cases where issues are of vital interest for the communities

Property

Two property regimes: for areas under territorial adjustment and the rest regime to be constructed in a way that would lend itself to give priority to dispossessed owners, for areas not under territorial adjustment regime to be constructed in a way that would lend itself to give priority current users. Specific elements to be further elaborated.

Equivalent treatment

Free movement of goods (= customs union + a quota to be agreed for primary agricultural products), services and capital are ok.

Free movement of persons: the regime will permit tourists, students and seasonal workers. For those seeking permanent residence, equitable treatment will be granted to Greek and Turkish nationals in Cyprus.

Security and guarantees

Secretary General outlined that he did not think that a system in which right of intervention would remain would be sustainable. He said that areas that are under the Treaty of Guarantees could be replaced by adequate implementation monitoring mechanisms, covering various aspects, to be mutually agreed. In some of these, Guarantor Powers could be involved. A security system should ensure that both communities feel safe in a united Cyprus, while the security of one should not come at the detriment of the other.

The issue of troops is a different question relative to the Treaty of Guarantees, and to be handled in a different format. Issues related to troops (numbers, withdrawals if and when they will need to leave, timelines, etc.) to be agreed at the highest level when time is ripe.

Shall We Build Mistrust or Confidence?

Esra Aygin

Crans Montana, So Near But Still So Far

In a little over two years, Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci and Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades made unprecedented progress in the six chapters the negotiations were organised into: governance and power-sharing, economy, European Union matters, property, territory, and security and guarantees.

For the first time in the history of Cyprus negotiations, the sides presented each other with maps of territorial adjustments, while in another unprecedented development, the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance were opened to negotiation. The two sides in Cyprus and the guarantor powers , Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom sat around a table for the first time in mid-January 2017 in Geneva to discuss a new security and guarantee model for a future federal Cyprus with the overarching principle that the security of one community could not come at the expense of the security of the other.

Besides achieving unprecedented progress at the table, other important efforts were carried out in preparation of a solution. The European Commission conducted hundreds of working group meetings, seminars and fact-finding missions on subjects like customs, immigration and border control with the aim of preparing the north for a solution. Financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank provided technical assistance on the financial sectors, macroeconomic and fiscal frameworks and the public administration of a future united Cyprus.

The Conference on Cyprus convened in Crans Montana on 28 June as a culmination of all these efforts for the final give-and-take on the outstanding issues relating to governance and power-sharing, property, territory, security and guarantees, and the equivalent treatment of Turkish and Greek citizens.

To make it easier to reach an understanding on these issues, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, on 30 June, tabled a framework, which eliminated extreme positions and provided a tool to deal with them in the form of a package.

When the final dinner at Crans Montana came to an abrupt end in the early hours of 7 July 2017, everyone around the table knew what the final deal on a bizonal bicommunal federal Cyprus would have looked like. It was not a lack of agreement, perhaps a lack of political will and courage that led to the collapse of the process.

As Guterres wrote in his report on his mission of good offices in Cyprus on 28 September 2017:

“…the essence of a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem is practically there. The parties had come close to reaching a strategic understanding on security and guarantees, as well as on all other outstanding core elements of a comprehensive settlement.” The Secretary General highlighted that the reason for the collapse was not a lack of agreement on core issues but rather, of “political will, courage and determination, mutual trust and a readiness on the part of all parties to take calculated risks…”

Building Mistrust, Not Confidence

Ever since the negotiations to unite Cyprus under a bizonal, bicommunal federation collapsed in Crans Montana in the early hours of 7 July 2017, elements in the northern part of the island with a vested interest in the continuation of status quo, have been vocal and active in promoting separation and division in an effort to complicate future federation attempts.

Clearly encouraged by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu’s statement that solutions outside UN parameters should now be sought for Cyprus right after the talks failed, Tahsin Ertugruloglu, the right-wing Turkish Cypriot official responsible for foreign affairs, declared that the federal model is dead. He suggested two options: an independent state in the northern part of Cyprus or the delegation of defence and foreign policy matters to Ankara, much like the relationship between Monaco and France.

Although Ertugruloglu’s comments do not seem to reflect any serious considerations on the ground, the hawkish official has taken some measures that seriously hamper relations between the two sides of the Green Line and led to an increase in nationalist and separatist sentiments. 

Saying that the north’s relations with the south and the United Nations should change, Ertugruloglu imposed customs duties on humanitarian aid like food supplies and baby diapers delivered weekly by the UN to Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north. The delivery of humanitarian aid to the Greek Cypriots and Maronites, which is based on the 1975 Third Vienna Agreement, has been limited to medical aid supplies since 1 October.

The third Vienna Agreement provided that Greek Cypriots in the north of the island were free to stay. They were to be given every help to lead a normal life, including facilities for education and practicing religion, as well as medical care by their own doctors. They were entitled to free movement in the north of Cyprus.

Turkish Cypriot leader, Mustafa Akinci, publicly criticised Ertugruloglu for imposing the tax, saying his decision was akin to shooting oneself in the foot. However the Turkish Cypriot leader’s authority and powers are limited to the negotiations to solve the Cyprus problem and he has no say in the running of domestic issues in the north. 

In another controversial move, Tahsin Ertugruloglu has been giving less and less permissions to Greek Cypriots to conduct religious services in the churches in the north. When he came to office in April 2016, Ertugruloglu introduced new rules for permissions, according to which, religious ceremonies in churches except major sites Ayios Barnabas, Apostolos Andreas and Ayios Mamas, were restricted to once a year.

However, in September, Ertugruloglu also refused to give permission to a religious service at the Ayios Mamas Cathedral in Morphou. This was the first time a request to hold a religious service at Ayios Mamas was declined by Turkish Cypriot authorities since 2003.

Although no Greek Cypriot political party or politician has spoken publicly in favour of a partition, forces that are opposed to a settlement in the south have also used the collapse of negotiations to take certain actions to the detriment of peace prospects.

Immediately after the Conference on Cyprus closed, the Greek Cypriot side requested that a bicommunal EU ad-hoc committee established to prepare the Turkish Cypriot community – with the help of European Commission experts - for the implementation of the EU legal order, cease its activities. Other bicommunal technical committee such as the committee on culture and arts, education and cultural heritage, which have been operating since 2005, were ordered to immediately freeze their activities.

In another move, the foreign ministry in the south issued instructions for non-EU tourists arriving in Cyprus airports, Larnaca and Paphos, and planning to stay in hotels in the north to be denied entry and sent back.

Most recently, Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades’ ruling DISY, together with a number of other right-wing parties on the Limassol municipal council approved the construction of a monument dedicated to George Grivas, the leader of Greek Cypriot paramilitary groups EOKA and EOKA B, who is viewed by many Turkish Cypriots as the man responsible for the inter-communal clashes that led to the division of the island.

The mistrust, resentment and increase in nationalist sentiments that result from such actions on both sides of the island are conducive to the continuation of the status quo and are celebrated by elements that have vested interests in the current division of the island.

The collapse of the political process also had a detrimental effect on the public sentiment on both sides of the island. The lack of involvement of civil society in the negotiations and failure of leaders to set up a joint public communication strategy from the very beginning of the process, followed by the tragic collapse of talks led to a crisis of confidence between the two communities and a rise in nationalist sentiment and rhetoric.

Building Confidence, Not Mistrust

What all Cypriots need to realise is that the status quo is not sustainable and will

eventually lead to permanent partition in Cyprus, as in the absence of a solution the northern part of Cyprus will rapidly integrate/disintegrate into Turkey. It is therefore high time for ordinary Cypriots to recognise where their interests lie and raise their voices against the separatist elements on both parts of the island.

It is exactly for this reason no time should be lost in meeting shortly after the final round of presidential elections in the southern part of the island to seal a strategic agreement on the core elements identified in the framework set out by the United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres in Crans Montana. Delaying this would risk losing all convergences that have been achieved – most of them unprecedented - and could put the Cyprus solution on hold for many years to come.

The ‘dead’ time until the elections should be used by both sides to implement unilateral and bilateral confidence building measures with the aim of improving trust between the two communities, which has taken a huge blow with the collapse of negotiations and the ensuing blame game.

Cypriots can still reclaim the chance they lost in Crans Montana after the elections in the south, if their leaders, this time, can display the necessary political will, courage, determination and understanding to go that extra mile for a strategic agreement within the Guterres framework and work jointly to engage the public and build support for a unified future.

Crunch time for Cyprus

June  2015 

By Esra Aygin

The technical aspect of negotiations aimed at reuniting the divided island within 2016 is almost finalised, with the process soon becoming purely political.

The political course will require the two leaders, Nicos Anastasiades and Mustafa Akinci to display political will and courage to take decisions on some of the most difficult issues.

Greek Cypriot negotiator Andreas Mavroyiannis, who is running for president of the UN General Assembly, will leave for New York at the end of May.

The aim by then is for him and Turkish Cypriot negotiator Ozdil Nami to wrap up the negotiations on the four topics of the Cyprus problem– governance, property, European Union affairs, and economy.

EU affairs and economy have largely been completed and the two negotiators will be focusing on governance and property, during the eight meetings they are scheduled to have this month.

“The negotiations will then move on to the next level, which will be handled by the leaders themselves,” a source said.

According to the source, the governance topic has largely been covered, with the two sides now working on finalising the details about the competence of constituent states to make international agreements in certain areas, and the regulation of voting rights in the elections for local administrations.

Although rotating presidency has not formally been accepted by the Greek Cypriot side, the main point of disagreement between the sides is not this, but the periods of rotation, according to the source.

While the Greek Cypriot side wants the rotation to be based on a four-year to one-year mandate, the Turkish Cypriot side is insisting that the Turkish Cypriot president holds the office for at least two years.

The negotiators have also made considerable progress on property and the sides now, for the first time in the history of Cyprus negotiations, have a joint paper on the topic.

The property convergence paper is mostly made up of black ink, which signifies agreements, the source said.

With wide agreement on definitions including ‘current user,’ and who will get which remedy – reinstatement, compensation, exchange – under which conditions, the sides are now working on how exactly to define ‘emotional attachment’, which will be a criteria applied to solve property problems.

If the process goes as hoped, Akinci and Anastasiades will start to discuss the territory issue in June.

When adequate progress is achieved in territory, the sides will come together with the three guarantor powers, Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, to discuss the last topic of the negotiations, which is security and guarantees.

Some behind-the-scenes diplomacy has provided for a general understanding between the sides that the existing guarantee system will be amended to provide a feeling of security for both Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

Some ideas being pondered are the increased involvement of the UN in the security scheme, and working more with the Treaty of Alliance and less with the Treaty of Guarantee.

With August and December being holiday months, June and July will be crucial in determining whether or not Cyprus will be united this year.

Coalition of the willing

May 28, 2015 

By Esra Aygin

By achieving much more in little over a month than what was achieved in the last five years, the two Cypriot leaders have already proven that where there is a will, there is a way.
In a fresh round of negotiations – widely seen as the best and probably the last opportunity to reunify the island – leaders Mustafa Akinci and Nicos Anastasiades started discussing the core issues of the Cyprus problem this week.
The substantial discussions are based on a roughly 100-page document that shows the convergences and divergences between the sides on all topics.
Negotiators Özdil Nami and Andreas Mavroyiannis, together with their teams, worked exhaustingly since May to put together the document – namely the Akinci-Anastasiades document – in an effort to create a common ground for negotiations.
The Akinci-Anastasiades document is branded ‘the most comprehensive document in Cyprus negotiations after the Annan Plan’ by the Turkish Cypriot leader’s spokesperson Barış Burcu.
It is viewed as a concrete demonstration of the political will of the leaders, as well as the strength and ability of their negotiators and teams.
The substantial discussions, which began on the chapters of governance, property and criteria on territory on Monday, were conducted in a very ‘constructive, respectful and positive atmosphere’ insiders said.
However, the most difficult phase has just only begun.
The negotiating teams led by Nami and Mavroyiannis are to meet at least three times a week to bridge the gaps, or divergences, in the Akinci-Anastasiades document.
The next meeting of the leaders is scheduled for July 10.
The undeclared goal of this exhausting pace is to achieve substantial progress by late October or early November, when a five-party multilateral meeting with the participation of guarantors – Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom – is envisaged, according to a Turkish Cypriot official.
The multi-lateral meeting will serve to mainly tackle the thorny issue of guarantees. Signalling that guarantees may no longer be a red line for Turkey, a number of Turkish officials have recently stated that they are open to discussing the issue in a five-party conference when the time comes and the roadmap for a solution is clearer.
During the new phase of substantial negotiations, all the unresolved core issues of the Cyprus problem – namely governance, EU affairs, economy, property, territory and security will be taken up in a holistic and interdependent manner.
The aim of both sides as well as the United Nations is to reach a comprehensive federal solution to the Cyprus problem at the earliest possible time.
Avoiding strict timeframes and calling for caution about raising unrealistic expectations, the Turkish Cypriot official stated that referenda on the reunification of Cyprus in the spring of 2016 is not out of reach provided the sides proceed at this pace and level of mutual understanding. However, as he also underlined, it is still too early to say.
Akinci, after Monday’s meeting had stated: “We will work with everything we have to take forward this negotiation process in a constructive and positive atmosphere, to create a bizonal, bicommunal federation as soon as possible and to be ready to submit it to the approval of our people. I hope this process will end in success.”
A UN official described the atmosphere of negotiations as “amazing” where the two leaders and their teams are on the table as partners of a shared future for the first time ever rather than two competitors.
Espen Barth Eide, the UN Secretary General’s Special Advisor on Cyprus, also sounded very upbeat about the mood in the negotiations after Monday’s meeting, declaring that: “Yesterday and today have probably been the best days in my current job because of the creation of this unique atmosphere of trust, and will, and leadership… I think that it is almost impossible to say that peace will not come, because peace really has a chance in Cyprus.”
A failure in this round of negotiations between Akinci and Anastasiades is likely to kill all hopes of a federal solution on the island. Therefore, Akinci and Anastasiades have on their shoulders a historic responsibility.
It remains to be seen whether the positive atmosphere will continue when the two sides will have to reach agreements on difficult core issues of the Cyprus problem such as property, territory, guarantees, which have derailed talks in the past.
However, it seems clear that one very important element that has been lacking in previous negotiations is present in the current one: empathy.