Higher-than-expected support for solution in World Bank survey

April 7, 2019

There has been a whopping 173 per cent increase in the number of cars crossing from the Greek Cypriot side to the Turkish Cypriot side since 2015

Some surprising results from the 1,000 Greek and Turkish Cypriots asked about federation, land, troops, guarantees and contact with the other side

By Esra Aygin

An EU financed World Bank survey has revealed that despite the prevailing negative atmosphere, the desire and support for a solution in Cyprus is very high among both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities.

The survey also demonstrates that increased contact and information could boost support for a solution.

Predictably, a major concern for Turkish Cypriots was the strength of the constituent states in a federation while for Greek Cypriots it was land and property. More surprising was that the issue of guarantees and troops was not higher on the Greek Cypriot priority list.

According to “The pulse of reunification: Insights from Cyprus” conducted among a total of 1,000 individuals on both sides of the island in December 2018, 66 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 72 per cent of Turkish Cypriots desire a solution.

Responding to the question: “How are you most likely to vote in a possible referendum for a solution plan agreed between the leadership of the two communities?” 59 per cent of Turkish Cypriots and 48 per cent of Greek Cypriots said “yes”. The figures increased to 66 per cent and 64 per cent respectively when the undecided were excluded.

The survey has already been presented to the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot negotiation teams, and was mentioned by United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in his January report on Unficyp, but has only now been made available to some sections of the media.

Providing invaluable insight on the main concerns of the communities regarding reunification, the survey shows that the Turkish Cypriot community would prefer a federation with stronger constituent states. “Reassurance of autonomy/self-rule for each community under Federal system” ranked first in the Turkish Cypriot community’s priority list to support a solution. About 35 per cent of Turkish Cypriot respondents said this would increase their support for a solution, while this was a priority for only 15 per cent of Greek Cypriot respondents.

The main factor that would increase the Greek Cypriot community’s support for a solution was “Favourable terms on the land and properties issues”. Over 20 per cent of Greek Cypriot respondents said this was a priority, while this issue ranked last for the Turkish Cypriots with 14.7 per cent saying it would increase their support for a solution.

Despite popular perception, guarantees and troops ranked lower on the Greek Cypriot priority list. Some 14 per cent of Greek Cypriots said “Favourable terms on the issue of guarantor powers (Turkey/Greece)” and 11 per cent said “Favourable terms on presence of foreign troops in Cyprus” would increase their support for a solution.

The survey also revealed that the groups least likely to vote “yes” in a referendum within both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities are almost the same and are respectively: the financially vulnerable, youth, females and those living in rural areas.

Regions with the lowest percentage of “yes” votes are Kyrenia and Famagusta in the northern part of Cyprus, and Limassol and Famagusta in the southern part of Cyprus, according to the survey.  The survey also shows that the highest percentage of undecided Turkish Cypriots live in Morphou (19 per cent), which almost definitely will be included in territories returned to the Greek Cypriots in the event of a solution. The highest percentage of undecided Greek Cypriots live in Famagusta (25 per cent).

The survey also verified the transformative effect of contact between the two communities. According to the survey, which showed that three fourths of the total 1,000 respondents had contact with someone from the other community, positive and neutral contact were associated with a higher support for solution, while negative experiences did not negatively affect support. Turkish Cypriots engaged in recent contact with the Greek Cypriot community were 39 per cent more likely to vote “yes” in a referendum compared with those without recent contact, while Greek Cypriots engaged in recent contact with Turkish Cypriots were 32 per cent more likely to vote “yes” in a referendum.

Contact also made a dramatic difference for most of the groups within each community that are least likely to vote “yes” in a referendum. According to the survey, while 48.7 per cent of the financially vulnerable Turkish Cypriots without contact with Greek Cypriots would say “yes” in a referendum, 61 per cent of the financially vulnerable Turkish Cypriots with contact with Greek Cypriots would say “yes”. Only 37.2 per cent of financially vulnerable Greek Cypriots without contact with Turkish Cypriots would vote “yes,” while over 71.5 per cent of financially vulnerable Greek Cypriots with contact with Turkish Cypriots would vote “yes”.

The survey found that 48.8 per cent of Turkish Cypriot youth without contact with Greek Cypriots would vote “yes” in a referendum, while support for a “yes” vote among those with contact increased to 76.4 per cent. In the Greek Cypriot community, about 40 per cent of youth without contact with Turkish Cypriots would vote “yes”, while almost 60 per cent of youth with contact with Turkish Cypriots would vote “yes.”

Contact increased support for a “yes” vote among Turkish Cypriot females from 52.8 per cent to 76 per cent. For the Greek Cypriot females, support for a “yes” vote among those with contact with the Turkish Cypriots only increased by about 2.2 percentage points compared with those without contact.

According to the report, which also includes comparative data from recent years, there has been a whopping 173 per cent increase in the number of cars crossing from the Greek Cypriot side to the Turkish Cypriot side since 2015. The increase in the number of cars crossing from the Turkish Cypriot side to the Greek Cypriot side in the same period was 22 per cent. The report includes that Greek Cypriots spent 15.4 million euros in the north, while Turkish Cypriots spent 17.6 million euros in the south in 2018.

The survey also showed that the willingness of respondents from both communities to vote “yes” in a referendum increased when they were informed. For example, when they were told that there is widespread support for a solution across both communities, the percentage of Turkish Cypriots, who would vote “yes” in a referendum increased from 57.5 per cent to almost 60 per cent, while the percentage of Greek Cypriots increased from 44.8 per cent to over 50 per cent, which would be the required majority to pass a settlement in a referendum.

https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/04/07/higher-than-expected-support-for-solution-in-world-bank-survey/

British High Commissioner Matthew Kidd: Chance for solution will be lost soon

You need to “define what a settlement could look like in terms that focus on the future that it would bring, rather than the past that it would be designed to correct.”

“There is still just a chance… If it doesn’t happen very soon - within months - then really the opportunity will have been lost.”

“In Switzerland during last year, new ground was being broken. And it was being broken in a constructive way, which brought answers to the last outstanding questions, particularly on security and guarantees within reach.”

The Secretary General’s framework shows us that what is left is a specific set of big things, which need to be addressed interdependently. And that needs a different kind of process.”

 “It would be very difficult for Cyprus to exploit its hydrocarbons if there is no solution.”

“There is a really important difference politically, economically, in terms of mentality between a status quo we put up with because we think it’s a temporary stepping stone on the way to a better outcome, and the status quo, which is all we have got left once that prospect of a better alternative no longer exists.”

ESRA AYGIN

Now that you are leaving the island, maybe you can tell me what really happened in Crans Montana.

Kidd: This question points us backwards but what we need is to look forward. And that is part of a bigger challenge to define what a settlement could look like in terms that focus on the future that it would bring, rather than the past that it would be designed to correct. It needs to correct that past of course, it needs to reflect that experiences. But it needs to look forward as well. And the more we focus on the advantages that it can bring, and the kind of Cyprus that it can make possible, the easier it is to find a way of designing it to support those positive, forward looking goals.

“In Switzerland during last year, new ground was being broken. And it was being broken in a constructive way, which brought answers to the last outstanding questions, particularly on security and guarantees within reach.”

Do you agree with the UN Secretary General that a historic chance was missed in Crans Montana?

Kidd: It would have been a historic achievement, no question. It was an opportunity to achieve that historic achievement, no question. It was missed. But if you start calling it a historic opportunity, you do tend to suggest that it is all over. And I don’t think we are quite there. I think that in those three sessions in Switzerland during last year, new ground was being broken. And it was being broken in a constructive way, which brought answers to the last outstanding questions, particularly on security and guarantees within reach. And that material, that thinking, those discussions are still available, could still be utilized. So that’s why I don’t think it’s all over. But that material and the kind of political climate in which those discussions happened is not going to wait forever for people to come back and use it. Even in the last 9 months as we have seen, people have started to walk back a bit from some of the thinking that they were ready to start doing then. Some of the more general climate has gotten worse. New problems have come up to make progress harder.

“There is still just a chance… If it doesn’t happen very soon - within months - then really the opportunity will have been lost.”

Is there still a chance?

Kidd: There is still just a chance. But the longer you leave it, the more things coming from outside, the more statements people make will make it harder and harder to rebuild the confidence. And without the confidence, you don’t rebuild the readiness to compromise, and you get to the end of the road. So, I think personally, that if it doesn’t happen very soon - within months - then really the opportunity will have been lost. This is the moment, which there either can be a settlement or the thing that we have all been working for, for all these years is not going to be able to happen.

The UNSG said the period after Crans Montana should be a period of reflection and consideration for all sides. Did the UK go through a reflection period?

Kidd: Definitely yes, absolutely.

Do you have a clearer idea of how to avoid now the failure that took place in Crans Montana?

Kidd: There were things that we were all trying to do, which it turned out we couldn’t do them in the way that we were trying to do them. It wasn’t a mistake necessarily, but it turned out not to be a successful route. There are ways in which the whole process worked, which I think didn’t work as well as we hoped they would. If some of the things, which happened on the last couple of days,

had happened earlier, if we had found ways of getting them onto the table earlier, we could have made more use overall of the time we had. I will give an example and leave it at that. The length of time that we spent in Crans Montana, the 10-12 days could have been really good. But we didn’t quite design it in ways, which meant that we used every day of that 10-12 day period as well as it could have been used. It’s worth thinking about whether another time it could be designed a little bit differently and maybe to think of a shorter block and then maybe another shorter block later rather than 12 days at once.

“The framework the Secretary General prepared was a very skillful, expert, balanced piece of work both in substance and in method… If we can get a process underway, it will be very good to use that.”

Now that everything has come to the table and we have the very skillfully prepared framework of the UN Secretary General, would it be an easier and smoother process if the sides can get back to the table?

Kidd: I think yes. I agree with you the framework the Secretary General prepared was a very skillful, expert, balanced piece of work both in substance and in method. It is encouraging to hear players of all sides valuing it and wanting to find ways of using it. So yes, if we can get a process underway, it will be very good to use that. It has never been available before. It found a way to bring together the elements that had in practice, up to that point, been treated separately even though we said they were to be interdependent.

I am assuming Britain is in touch with all the parties. Do you see there is commitment from all parties to this framework?

Kidd: I think at this stage they don’t all think of it in the same way. I think there is general agreement that it is valuable, that it is a model, which is worth trying to use. But I don’t think there is agreement on exactly is best to do with it.

“The best thing to do is to test Turkey.”

We heard from various sources that Turkey was willing to give up guarantees in Crans Montana even though this was not put in writing. Considering the developments since, is Turkey at the same position?

Kidd: I don’t know, but I think the best thing to do is to test Turkey and find out. I think it’s a real pity to reach the conclusion ‘They will never agree to it now’ without testing it. And this is a negotiating habit, which both sides have developed over the years, because they’ve been disappointed too often. They tend to think they know what the other will accept and they tend to be too quick to say ‘They will never do that.’ Without testing it, without trying, without offering something that will help make it happen. So I think in this case, we need to find the opportunity if we can, to test how ready Turkey now is.

“Division undermines security and political impact and makes it harder for Cyprus to play any effective part in protecting its own security in these difficult circumstances.”

Do the conflicts in the region increase the urgency of a solution?

Kidd: The developments in the region are an extra factor, an extra reason to think that a reunified Cyprus operating in a constructive, collaborative way -that it hasn’t done for all those years- would be a safer place in a difficult region than the current situation, where there is that extra division between the two parts of the island. A division, which undermines security and political impact, and makes it harder for Cyprus to play any effective part in protecting its own security in these difficult circumstances.

“It would be very difficult for Cyprus to exploit its hydrocarbons without a solution.”

Are we heading towards a bigger crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean with regards the hydrocarbon exploration activities?

Kidd: I hope the answer to your question is ‘no.’ We are a signatory of the Law of the Sea Convention, so we recognize Cyprus’ claim under the Law of the Sea Convention to its EEZ and its right to exploit that. But we also see that potentially the fact that there are hydrocarbons in these waters is a new factor to underline the value of a settlement. Our hope is that as development of the hydrocarbons goes forward, this is done in light of efforts to reach a settlement. Because then, everyone gets the benefits from it in the easiest way.

If there is no solution would it be possible for Cyprus to exploit its hydrocarbons?

Kidd: I think it gets very difficult. The good scenario is that there is a settlement and it’s win-win for everybody. The bad scenario is that there isn’t a settlement and it gets very hard for anybody to get any benefit from it.

What is our biggest challenge now to get a negotiation process started?

Kidd: There is a lot of skepticism in public opinion. Each time there is a moment of hope, where it looks as thought something is finally going to happen and then it doesn’t, that skepticism risks getting deeper. And that, of course, is reflected in the leaders’ sense of where their own public opinion is, and how much room for maneuever they have, and how much political will they are ready to show. Plus, that sense of not a clear enough vision of what a future could look like in a settlement.

But both sides know quite well what a solution will look like.

Kidd: I agree with you. It’s pretty clear what the outcome of the deal looks like. What is not so clear is what it opens the way to. How a reunified Cyprus would work, what opportunities would become possible in it. That’s what is missing. There has been little effort to educate people, to explain to them, to offer to them what openings a settlement would provide, how life could look better in a solution.

In case of non-solution “the dilemmas for the Turkish Cypriots would become more acute. For Greek Cypriots, the assets that they have, the opportunities that could await them would be harder over time to grasp.”

What awaits Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots in case of non-solution?

Kidd: What I am quite confident about is that the prospects for both sides would be worse. The dilemmas for the Turkish Cypriots would become more acute. For Greek Cypriots, the assets that they have, the opportunities that could await them would be harder over time to grasp. Some of the handicaps that they have faced and tolerated facing because there would be a deal, would become more and more binding. There is a really important difference politically, economically, in terms of mentality, between a status quo we put up with because we think it’s a temporary stepping stone on the way to a better outcome, and the status quo, which is all we have got left once that prospect of a better alternative no longer exists.

The leaders are having a dinner on 16 April. What would be the best outcome at the dinner?

Kidd: I think it’s right to start with quite modest expectations. They meet after 9 months and they probably both saved up quite a lot of frustrations and grumbles about each other to get off their chest. So that has to happen. I hope that they will both, in the course of that conversation, hear each other saying that they still want to bring this negotiation to a conclusion and that their communities need that. If they can hear each other saying that, then this shows that they want to try now to design a way of doing that, which will need to be a bit different from what we had before.

“The Secretary General’s framework shows us that what is left is a specific set of big things, which need to be addressed interdependently. And that needs a different kind of process.”

How should the process be different?

Kidd: The stage that we reached last summer, what there is left to do, and the Secretary General’s framework mean that we are at a different stage of the process. We have been through a long period of laborious, detailed settlement of most of the internal issues. We got past that. We know what is left. The Secretary General’s framework shows us that what is left is a specific set of big things, which need to be addressed interdependently. And that needs a different kind of process. And the leaders need to figure out how. I can’t design their negotiating method for them but I think that it is sensible to think that this is now a stage, which may need different methodologies.

Shall We Build Mistrust or Confidence?

Esra Aygin

Crans Montana, So Near But Still So Far

In a little over two years, Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci and Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades made unprecedented progress in the six chapters the negotiations were organised into: governance and power-sharing, economy, European Union matters, property, territory, and security and guarantees.

For the first time in the history of Cyprus negotiations, the sides presented each other with maps of territorial adjustments, while in another unprecedented development, the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance were opened to negotiation. The two sides in Cyprus and the guarantor powers , Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom sat around a table for the first time in mid-January 2017 in Geneva to discuss a new security and guarantee model for a future federal Cyprus with the overarching principle that the security of one community could not come at the expense of the security of the other.

Besides achieving unprecedented progress at the table, other important efforts were carried out in preparation of a solution. The European Commission conducted hundreds of working group meetings, seminars and fact-finding missions on subjects like customs, immigration and border control with the aim of preparing the north for a solution. Financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank provided technical assistance on the financial sectors, macroeconomic and fiscal frameworks and the public administration of a future united Cyprus.

The Conference on Cyprus convened in Crans Montana on 28 June as a culmination of all these efforts for the final give-and-take on the outstanding issues relating to governance and power-sharing, property, territory, security and guarantees, and the equivalent treatment of Turkish and Greek citizens.

To make it easier to reach an understanding on these issues, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, on 30 June, tabled a framework, which eliminated extreme positions and provided a tool to deal with them in the form of a package.

When the final dinner at Crans Montana came to an abrupt end in the early hours of 7 July 2017, everyone around the table knew what the final deal on a bizonal bicommunal federal Cyprus would have looked like. It was not a lack of agreement, perhaps a lack of political will and courage that led to the collapse of the process.

As Guterres wrote in his report on his mission of good offices in Cyprus on 28 September 2017:

“…the essence of a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem is practically there. The parties had come close to reaching a strategic understanding on security and guarantees, as well as on all other outstanding core elements of a comprehensive settlement.” The Secretary General highlighted that the reason for the collapse was not a lack of agreement on core issues but rather, of “political will, courage and determination, mutual trust and a readiness on the part of all parties to take calculated risks…”

Building Mistrust, Not Confidence

Ever since the negotiations to unite Cyprus under a bizonal, bicommunal federation collapsed in Crans Montana in the early hours of 7 July 2017, elements in the northern part of the island with a vested interest in the continuation of status quo, have been vocal and active in promoting separation and division in an effort to complicate future federation attempts.

Clearly encouraged by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu’s statement that solutions outside UN parameters should now be sought for Cyprus right after the talks failed, Tahsin Ertugruloglu, the right-wing Turkish Cypriot official responsible for foreign affairs, declared that the federal model is dead. He suggested two options: an independent state in the northern part of Cyprus or the delegation of defence and foreign policy matters to Ankara, much like the relationship between Monaco and France.

Although Ertugruloglu’s comments do not seem to reflect any serious considerations on the ground, the hawkish official has taken some measures that seriously hamper relations between the two sides of the Green Line and led to an increase in nationalist and separatist sentiments. 

Saying that the north’s relations with the south and the United Nations should change, Ertugruloglu imposed customs duties on humanitarian aid like food supplies and baby diapers delivered weekly by the UN to Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north. The delivery of humanitarian aid to the Greek Cypriots and Maronites, which is based on the 1975 Third Vienna Agreement, has been limited to medical aid supplies since 1 October.

The third Vienna Agreement provided that Greek Cypriots in the north of the island were free to stay. They were to be given every help to lead a normal life, including facilities for education and practicing religion, as well as medical care by their own doctors. They were entitled to free movement in the north of Cyprus.

Turkish Cypriot leader, Mustafa Akinci, publicly criticised Ertugruloglu for imposing the tax, saying his decision was akin to shooting oneself in the foot. However the Turkish Cypriot leader’s authority and powers are limited to the negotiations to solve the Cyprus problem and he has no say in the running of domestic issues in the north. 

In another controversial move, Tahsin Ertugruloglu has been giving less and less permissions to Greek Cypriots to conduct religious services in the churches in the north. When he came to office in April 2016, Ertugruloglu introduced new rules for permissions, according to which, religious ceremonies in churches except major sites Ayios Barnabas, Apostolos Andreas and Ayios Mamas, were restricted to once a year.

However, in September, Ertugruloglu also refused to give permission to a religious service at the Ayios Mamas Cathedral in Morphou. This was the first time a request to hold a religious service at Ayios Mamas was declined by Turkish Cypriot authorities since 2003.

Although no Greek Cypriot political party or politician has spoken publicly in favour of a partition, forces that are opposed to a settlement in the south have also used the collapse of negotiations to take certain actions to the detriment of peace prospects.

Immediately after the Conference on Cyprus closed, the Greek Cypriot side requested that a bicommunal EU ad-hoc committee established to prepare the Turkish Cypriot community – with the help of European Commission experts - for the implementation of the EU legal order, cease its activities. Other bicommunal technical committee such as the committee on culture and arts, education and cultural heritage, which have been operating since 2005, were ordered to immediately freeze their activities.

In another move, the foreign ministry in the south issued instructions for non-EU tourists arriving in Cyprus airports, Larnaca and Paphos, and planning to stay in hotels in the north to be denied entry and sent back.

Most recently, Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades’ ruling DISY, together with a number of other right-wing parties on the Limassol municipal council approved the construction of a monument dedicated to George Grivas, the leader of Greek Cypriot paramilitary groups EOKA and EOKA B, who is viewed by many Turkish Cypriots as the man responsible for the inter-communal clashes that led to the division of the island.

The mistrust, resentment and increase in nationalist sentiments that result from such actions on both sides of the island are conducive to the continuation of the status quo and are celebrated by elements that have vested interests in the current division of the island.

The collapse of the political process also had a detrimental effect on the public sentiment on both sides of the island. The lack of involvement of civil society in the negotiations and failure of leaders to set up a joint public communication strategy from the very beginning of the process, followed by the tragic collapse of talks led to a crisis of confidence between the two communities and a rise in nationalist sentiment and rhetoric.

Building Confidence, Not Mistrust

What all Cypriots need to realise is that the status quo is not sustainable and will

eventually lead to permanent partition in Cyprus, as in the absence of a solution the northern part of Cyprus will rapidly integrate/disintegrate into Turkey. It is therefore high time for ordinary Cypriots to recognise where their interests lie and raise their voices against the separatist elements on both parts of the island.

It is exactly for this reason no time should be lost in meeting shortly after the final round of presidential elections in the southern part of the island to seal a strategic agreement on the core elements identified in the framework set out by the United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres in Crans Montana. Delaying this would risk losing all convergences that have been achieved – most of them unprecedented - and could put the Cyprus solution on hold for many years to come.

The ‘dead’ time until the elections should be used by both sides to implement unilateral and bilateral confidence building measures with the aim of improving trust between the two communities, which has taken a huge blow with the collapse of negotiations and the ensuing blame game.

Cypriots can still reclaim the chance they lost in Crans Montana after the elections in the south, if their leaders, this time, can display the necessary political will, courage, determination and understanding to go that extra mile for a strategic agreement within the Guterres framework and work jointly to engage the public and build support for a unified future.