Was constitutional referendum a rehearsal
of possible settlement referendum?
On 29 June, the Republican Turkish Party (CTP)
did not only suffer a huge wound by losing the three biggest cities – Nicosia,
Famagusta and Kyrenia - in the local elections, but was also shaken by the
rejection of a set of constitutional amendments that it advocated strongly. The
amendments were submitted to a referendum on the same day as the local
elections.
The constitution of the “Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus,” adopted in 1985, is a shameful copy of the 1982
constitution of Turkey – the product of the 12 September 1982 military coup.
For the first time in almost 30 years, some changes – albeit small – were made through
the efforts of mainly the CTP deputies and adopted unanimously by all the
parties in parliament – the bigger party of the ruling coalition CTP, the
smaller party of the ruling coalition right-wing Democratic Party (DP), main
opposition right wing National Unity Party (UBP), and the left-wing Social
Democracy Party (TDP).
The proposed amendments had initially
called for the lifting of temporary article 10 - which is the legal basis for
the Turkish Cypriot police to be under the control of the Turkish military, and
the introduction of conscientious objection. However, CTP could not get the
required support in parliament to go ahead with these changes and therefore, limited
the amendments to some 20 articles.
Although the amendments, which among
others, introduced children’s rights, limited the immunity of politicians,
improved fundamental rights, and lifted the political ban on civil servants,
were adopted unanimously by all the parties in parliament, they were rejected
by 65% in the referendum.
Two major factors seem to have played an
important role in the rejection of the constitutional amendments. First is the
radical approach of the left-wing parties and non-governmental organisations,
which criticised the amendments for being “cosmetic” and not touching on the
substantial provisions – such as the temporary article 10.
The second, and the scarier, is the undercover,
ear-to-ear no-campaign led by hardliner Turkish Cypriot leader Derviş Eroğlu,
who has a significant influence on both UBP and DP, and the supporters of his ideology.
Although the more optimistic in the
northern part of Cyprus would argue that the ‘no’ vote is the victory of the
radical left, a strong message of rejection of the status quo and the 1985 constitution,
I fear that this referendum was a rehearsal of the nationalist guardians of the
status quo, to test the grounds. And I fear very much that this method of
undercover campaigning against a unanimously adopted text, tested and proven to
be successful, can be put to work during a possible referendum for a federal
settlement in Cyprus.
Those, against the reunification of Cyprus
through a federal solution know now that giving approval to a settlement text does
not necessarily lead to a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum.
No comments:
Post a Comment