Higher-than-expected support for solution in World Bank survey

April 7, 2019

There has been a whopping 173 per cent increase in the number of cars crossing from the Greek Cypriot side to the Turkish Cypriot side since 2015

Some surprising results from the 1,000 Greek and Turkish Cypriots asked about federation, land, troops, guarantees and contact with the other side

By Esra Aygin

An EU financed World Bank survey has revealed that despite the prevailing negative atmosphere, the desire and support for a solution in Cyprus is very high among both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities.

The survey also demonstrates that increased contact and information could boost support for a solution.

Predictably, a major concern for Turkish Cypriots was the strength of the constituent states in a federation while for Greek Cypriots it was land and property. More surprising was that the issue of guarantees and troops was not higher on the Greek Cypriot priority list.

According to “The pulse of reunification: Insights from Cyprus” conducted among a total of 1,000 individuals on both sides of the island in December 2018, 66 per cent of Greek Cypriots and 72 per cent of Turkish Cypriots desire a solution.

Responding to the question: “How are you most likely to vote in a possible referendum for a solution plan agreed between the leadership of the two communities?” 59 per cent of Turkish Cypriots and 48 per cent of Greek Cypriots said “yes”. The figures increased to 66 per cent and 64 per cent respectively when the undecided were excluded.

The survey has already been presented to the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot negotiation teams, and was mentioned by United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in his January report on Unficyp, but has only now been made available to some sections of the media.

Providing invaluable insight on the main concerns of the communities regarding reunification, the survey shows that the Turkish Cypriot community would prefer a federation with stronger constituent states. “Reassurance of autonomy/self-rule for each community under Federal system” ranked first in the Turkish Cypriot community’s priority list to support a solution. About 35 per cent of Turkish Cypriot respondents said this would increase their support for a solution, while this was a priority for only 15 per cent of Greek Cypriot respondents.

The main factor that would increase the Greek Cypriot community’s support for a solution was “Favourable terms on the land and properties issues”. Over 20 per cent of Greek Cypriot respondents said this was a priority, while this issue ranked last for the Turkish Cypriots with 14.7 per cent saying it would increase their support for a solution.

Despite popular perception, guarantees and troops ranked lower on the Greek Cypriot priority list. Some 14 per cent of Greek Cypriots said “Favourable terms on the issue of guarantor powers (Turkey/Greece)” and 11 per cent said “Favourable terms on presence of foreign troops in Cyprus” would increase their support for a solution.

The survey also revealed that the groups least likely to vote “yes” in a referendum within both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities are almost the same and are respectively: the financially vulnerable, youth, females and those living in rural areas.

Regions with the lowest percentage of “yes” votes are Kyrenia and Famagusta in the northern part of Cyprus, and Limassol and Famagusta in the southern part of Cyprus, according to the survey.  The survey also shows that the highest percentage of undecided Turkish Cypriots live in Morphou (19 per cent), which almost definitely will be included in territories returned to the Greek Cypriots in the event of a solution. The highest percentage of undecided Greek Cypriots live in Famagusta (25 per cent).

The survey also verified the transformative effect of contact between the two communities. According to the survey, which showed that three fourths of the total 1,000 respondents had contact with someone from the other community, positive and neutral contact were associated with a higher support for solution, while negative experiences did not negatively affect support. Turkish Cypriots engaged in recent contact with the Greek Cypriot community were 39 per cent more likely to vote “yes” in a referendum compared with those without recent contact, while Greek Cypriots engaged in recent contact with Turkish Cypriots were 32 per cent more likely to vote “yes” in a referendum.

Contact also made a dramatic difference for most of the groups within each community that are least likely to vote “yes” in a referendum. According to the survey, while 48.7 per cent of the financially vulnerable Turkish Cypriots without contact with Greek Cypriots would say “yes” in a referendum, 61 per cent of the financially vulnerable Turkish Cypriots with contact with Greek Cypriots would say “yes”. Only 37.2 per cent of financially vulnerable Greek Cypriots without contact with Turkish Cypriots would vote “yes,” while over 71.5 per cent of financially vulnerable Greek Cypriots with contact with Turkish Cypriots would vote “yes”.

The survey found that 48.8 per cent of Turkish Cypriot youth without contact with Greek Cypriots would vote “yes” in a referendum, while support for a “yes” vote among those with contact increased to 76.4 per cent. In the Greek Cypriot community, about 40 per cent of youth without contact with Turkish Cypriots would vote “yes”, while almost 60 per cent of youth with contact with Turkish Cypriots would vote “yes.”

Contact increased support for a “yes” vote among Turkish Cypriot females from 52.8 per cent to 76 per cent. For the Greek Cypriot females, support for a “yes” vote among those with contact with the Turkish Cypriots only increased by about 2.2 percentage points compared with those without contact.

According to the report, which also includes comparative data from recent years, there has been a whopping 173 per cent increase in the number of cars crossing from the Greek Cypriot side to the Turkish Cypriot side since 2015. The increase in the number of cars crossing from the Turkish Cypriot side to the Greek Cypriot side in the same period was 22 per cent. The report includes that Greek Cypriots spent 15.4 million euros in the north, while Turkish Cypriots spent 17.6 million euros in the south in 2018.

The survey also showed that the willingness of respondents from both communities to vote “yes” in a referendum increased when they were informed. For example, when they were told that there is widespread support for a solution across both communities, the percentage of Turkish Cypriots, who would vote “yes” in a referendum increased from 57.5 per cent to almost 60 per cent, while the percentage of Greek Cypriots increased from 44.8 per cent to over 50 per cent, which would be the required majority to pass a settlement in a referendum.

https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/04/07/higher-than-expected-support-for-solution-in-world-bank-survey/

Frustration over moves to block TC EU integration

By Esra Aygin

May 12, 2017

The EU ad-hoc committee needs to continue its work uninterrupted if the Green Line is to be erased on day one of a solution, a European Commission official told Cypriot leaders.

Director of European Commission’s structural reform support service Maarten Verwey presented Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci and Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades the EU ad-hoc committee’s findings on the level of preparedness of the Turkish Cypriot community to function within the EU.

“There is a lot that needs to be done both legally and administratively, and the short-term scheduling, cancellations, changes in plans on the part of Cypriots create difficulties for the Commission,” said a source.

“We can’t keep stopping and starting this effort. As long as the negotiations are ongoing, we have to continue.”

The bi-communal EU ad-hoc committee was set up under European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in 2015, with the aim of preparing the Turkish Cypriot side for the implementation of the EU acquis in the event of a solution.

The sides agree that the Green Line has to disappear on day one of a solution. Failure to do so would create a lot of practical problems, as it will not be the same as the administrative border between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot constituent states.

Since 2015, there have been a number of interruptions and obstructions stemming from both sides, the source said.

The committee has been delayed a number of times due to concerns of the Greek Cypriot side that the Turkish Cypriot entity may be upgraded through such relations and work with the Commission.

“There is always this concern on the Greek Cypriot side that ‘what if we help all this preparation but there is no solution’,” said the source.
“But this is a baseless concern. This effort is undertaken on the basis of the UN solution process.”

The right-wing Turkish Cypriot National Unity Party UBP-Democratic Party coalition has been obstructing the committee’s work by withholding some information and preventing key studies that need to be conducted in the banks, on the pretext that they are against EU methods and funding.

Akinci’s efforts to convince the coalition have, so far, been futile.

“This has been a big problem from day one,” a frustrated Akinci told reporters after his meeting with Verwey.

“It is really impossible to understand why the government would block an effort that would ensure our banks’ functioning in international finance.”

The main argument of the right-wing against a solution is that it will lead to the economic destruction of Turkish Cypriots and result in the collapse of all sectors.

Their campaign in the event of a referendum will probably be built on this argument.

Many observers agree, therefore, that they are doing everything to prevent any kind of preparation in the north for compliance with EU law.

Four Freedoms - what the Turkish side wants

By Esra Aygin

The term ‘four freedoms’ for Turkish nationals in a federal Cyprus entered our lives at the Geneva Conference in January.

Not because it was a new demand, but because the equitable treatment of Turkish and Greek nationals in Cyprus – an issue as old as the negotiations themselves – only came to be referred to as the ‘four freedoms’ at that Conference.

The balance of power between Turkey and Greece was first established in the constitution of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus, which gave the two countries the ‘most favoured nation’ status.

The Annan Plan included provisions to maintain the balance of power and extend equitable treatment to Turkish and Greek nationals in Cyprus.

Former leaders Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat had agreed “to extend to Turkish citizens, treatment as close as possible to the results of the enjoyment of the four freedoms of the EU by nationals of Greece.”

This agreement was also accepted by the current leaders Mustafa Akinci and Nicos Anastasiades in 2015. It must be underlined here that the sides also agreed that this arrangement would be of a “bilateral nature and limited to Cypriot territory”.

Per the Ankara Agreement, its Additional Protocol and Decisions of the Association Council and the Customs Union, Turkey already partly enjoys the EU’s four freedoms – namely the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital.

The European Court of Justice has also decided that these agreements give specific rights to Turkish nationals and businesses that are legally present in an EU member state (i.e. visa-free travel for Turkish service providers). Turkey being its fifth biggest trading partner, the EU market is already open to Turkish products from textiles to automotives.

Under Article 63 of the Lisbon Treaty all restrictions on the movement of capital between EU member states and third countries are prohibited. So what are the Turkish side’s demands in the context of a solution? The Turkish side wants Turkish nationals, who come to a federal Cyprus as tourists or students to be able to enter the country only with their passports without needing a visa – similar to the practice in the Greek islands.

When it comes to residence, the Turkish side is seeking a balance between the Turkish and Greek nationals residing on the island with the understanding that this doesn’t upset the demographic structure of the island. The sides are yet to agree on the ratio of Greek and Turkish residents, with the Greek Cypriot side demanding a 4:1 ratio.

While the Greek Cypriot side wants the 4:1 ratio to also apply for the Greek and Turkish workers on the island, the Turkish side argues that imposing a limit on Turkish labour force in a federal Cyprus would be a violation of the Ankara Agreement, which covers the free movement of workers, businesses and services between Turkey and EU.

Turkish and Greek Cypriot sides have already agreed that work permits in a federal Cyprus will be decided upon and given by a federal body with an equal number of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot members. Therefore, the fear that Turkish workers will flood Cyprus does not hold much ground.

Despite widespread reports claiming otherwise, the EU Commission has never came out publicly against granting equitable treatment to Turkish and Greek nationals in Cyprus.

The message repeatedly given by the Commission to the sides has been that the priority of the EU is the settlement of the Cyprus problem and that equitable treatment of Turkish and Greek nationals can be accommodated without any need for any special arrangements or derogations from EU law.

In fact, the practice is not novel to the EU as there already are some EU member states that extend such rights to non-EU countries (Portugal’s extension of such rights to Brazil).

"Four freedoms" in a gist

Actually this is not anything new that has just been introduced on the table. Those against it started calling it four freedoms to make it seem like a new demand. This is the principle of equivalent/equitable treatment of Turkish and Greek nationals that is in the 1960 RoC constitution. It was also in the Annan Plan (most favored nation) in the agreements between Christofias and Talat as well as Anastasiades and Akinci. If applied, it will only be effective in Cyprus and not in the rest of the EU... Very briefly, Turkish Citizens will be able to visit the federal Cyprus with their passports (This is already the case with all the Greek islands and last time I checked the islands were not flooded with lowly Turks. When it comes to residence, the agreement is that there will be a proportion (to be agreed on) between the resident Turks and Greeks on the condition that this doesn't upset the demographic structure of the island. In terms of working here, the work permits will be given by a federal body so there should be no concern there. When it comes to products, the EU and thus Cypriot market is open to Turkish products from textiles to automotive as per customs union. And there is no restriction of the free flow of capital anyway...
The principle of most favored country is not novel to the EU and in line with values and principles (see Portugal's extension of such rights to Brazil)

Turk equality card

By Esra Aygin

Reviving the Conference on Cyprus will largely depend on whether the Cypriot leaders are able to reach agreement on how Turkish and Greek nationals will be treated post settlement.

It is understood that Turkey signalled flexibility in guarantees only if there is agreement between the two sides on the four freedoms of the European Union to apply for Turkish nationals in the event of a solution.

“It seems that only after this issue is clarified, can a date for the next political session of the conference be set,” said a diplomatic source close to the negotiations. “The ball is back in the Cypriot leaders’” and the EU institution’s court.

Turkey’s demand is aimed at securing equal treatment of Turkish and Greek nationals – something based on the principle of ‘balance of power’ between Turkey and Greece which was originally established in the 1960 Constitution.

The Annan Plan also had provisions to retain the greatest possible balance between the rights in Cyprus of EU member Greece and non-EU member Turkey.

The principle of equal treatment of nationals from Turkey and Greece in the event of a solution had been agreed in principle by former Cypriot leaders Mehmet Ali Talat and Demetris Christofias, on condition that it did not affect the demographic structure of the island.

Leaders Mustafa Akinci and Nicos Anastasiades had confirmed this agreement at the beginning of the current process.

But positions at the table seem to be different, as Ankara’s demand for ‘equal treatment with Greece’ may well now mean applying the four freedoms of the EU unrestrictedly to Turkish nationals.

Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister Tugrul Turkes reiterated this demand on Wednesday, hours before Akinci and Anastasiades were to meet.

“We requested that the four freedoms should apply to Turkey,” said Turkes. “If not, then Greek nationals should be deprived of this also. In other words, let’s create equality in rights and privileges or in deprivation.”

Political observers agree that the full application of four freedoms of the EU to Turkish nationals is not realistic, while saying that certain parameters of the freedoms could apply in a way that furthers Turkey’s already existing privileges arising from the Customs Union and Ankara Agreements with the EU.

Observers also question how far Turkey can push this demand, as it could well lead to a deadlock in the process – something Turkey would not want to be responsible for.

An international Conference on Cyprus two weeks ago in Geneva brought together the Cypriot leaders and the foreign ministers of guarantor states – Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom – to discuss the thorny issue of security and guarantees.

The Conference continued last week in Mont Pelerin, Switzerland, where a working group of experts from all five parties discussed the issue at a technical level.

Although the agreement was to reconvene the Conference on a political level immediately thereafter, no date has yet been set, since any progress on security and guarantees now clearly depends on progress on the issue of equal treatment of Turks and Greeks.

http://in-cyprus.com/turk-equality-card/

Velvet revolution (The Cyprus Weekly, 6 November 2015)

By Esra Aygin

As the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders intensify negotiations aimed at reuniting Cyprus, a quiet revolution in the north, which involves adapting the legislative framework to European Union norms, is also gaining new ground.

Although there is no formal timeframe in the negotiations process, the sides are aiming at a settlement by May 2016, whereby the new bi-communal, bi-zonal federal Cyprus will be a full member of the EU from day one.

As focus shifts to the day after a settlement, the process of preparing the Turkish Cypriot side to function as part of the EU the day after a solution is now accelerating.

A special bi-communal ad-hoc committee has recently been established within the framework of the negotiations process with the aim of bringing the Turkish Cypriot laws and institutions up to EU standards and meet the demands of the Acquis Communautaire.

The committee, established under the auspices of the United Nations, will be working with experts from the EU, who will assist the northern part of the island to transpose and apply EU law.

“This preparatory work has to be undertaken to ensure that the EU acquis can be fully implemented in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state without delay in the case of a settlement,” said Erhan Ercin, who chairs the ad-hoc EU committee.

“If we are talking about a solution in six months, this is very urgent. Unless we get the full support of the EU to move forward with this work, the functionality of the federal Cyprus will be at risk.

“The acquis communautaire and EU legislation will become a new dividing line between the two sides and prevent unification after a settlement.”

Although Cyprus became a member of the EU in 2004 as a whole, the application of EU legislation in the north has been suspended.

The European Commission, through a task force for the Turkish Cypriot community established in 2004, has been assisting the north for the last decade with the transposition of EU legislation, capacity building and infrastructure projects.

In an effort to prepare for the future application of the acquis, a total of 86 laws and regulations under 16 chapters have already been harmonised with EU legislation and put into effect, covering a wide range of matters from occupational health and safety to anti money-laundering rules. Eleven laws including the civil service draft law, communicable diseases draft law, and veterinary services draft law are awaiting approval at the Turkish Cypriot ‘parliament’.

Under the European Commission’s assistance programme for the Turkish Cypriot community, the World Bank is also involved in the preparatory work in the north, mainly in the areas of public finances, private sector development and banking.

The priority of the ad-hoc EU committee now, will be to bring Turkish Cypriot legislation and institutions in line with those of the EU in areas like free movement of goods, taxation, customs and competition; and preparation for the adoption of the euro.

Reducing the development gap, ensuring longer-term ability of the Turkish Cypriot community to promote sustainable development within a reunified Cyprus and within the EU, minimising economic and social disparity between the two constituent states, reducing economic risks and ensuring a level playing field for all businesses will be the focus of the effort.

A team from the European Central Bank is expected to visit the island soon to initiate preliminary preparations for the adoption of the euro. Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci had earlier stated that the Turkish lira would stay in circulation in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state for a year following the settlement and then be completely replaced by the euro.

Matters such as hygiene, agriculture, food safety and veterinary care are other priorities, since they are directly related with the ability of the future Turkish Cypriot constituent state to sell its products within the EU.

The ad-hoc EU committee, which had its first meeting last week with the participation of Pieter Van Nuffel, the Personal Representative of the President of the European Commission to the UN Good Offices Mission in Cyprus, and experts from the EU, is currently formulating how the harmonisation work will be organised.

Some key EU laws adopted
•Competition
•Offshore Banking
•Prevention of the Laundering of
Revenues of Crime
•Identification and Registration
of Animals
•Protection from the Harms of Tobacco
•Consumer Protection
•Electronic Communication
•Environment
•Traffic Offences and Penalty Points
•Motor Vehicles

http://in-cyprus.com/quiet-revolution/

Article - Turkey's interest lies in a Cyprus solution (Published in Greek in 24h newspaper, March 2014)

Turkey’s interest lies in a Cyprus solution

Most Greek Cypriots don’t believe that Turkey genuinely wants a solution in Cyprus. It is commonly viewed as ill-intentioned, insincere, dishonest in this respect. And believe me, most Turkish Cypriots have trust issues with Turkey too. However, all these perceptions are wrong. Not because Turkey is well-intentioned, sincere or honest; but because intentions, sincerity or honesty are irrelevant. These are not the criteria that any country acts on. Countries act on interests.

Turkey pursued a policy of division in Cyprus for decades arguing that non-solution is the solution itself, because it believed that the status-quo was in its interest. The Justice and Development Party government, when it came to power in 2003, totally altered Turkey’s Cyprus policy because it realized that a solution in Cyprus would be in its interest: it would bring the county closer to the EU and improve its relations with the Western world. And today, Turkey, which aspires to become a big regional power in Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, is well aware that a solution in Cyprus would greatly increase its strategic importance, now more so, due to the discovery of hydrocarbons in the region.

Europe needs the Eastern Mediterranean gas to diversify its resources and maintain energy security. And the easiest, cheapest and most profitable way of exporting this gas to Europe is to transfer it with a pipeline through Turkey. This would not only benefit Turkey economically through cheaper supply of natural gas, but also turn Turkey into a critical transit point for natural gas to Europe. This would present Turkey with the opportunity to play a major role in the European energy policy and become a country of increased strategic importance in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Not to mention that Turkey will have solved one of the biggest problems that continuously hampers its relations with the international community, clear the way for a NATO-EU cooperation, shake off a huge economic burden that it has on its shoulders both because it constantly has to inject money into a unsustainable economy and because it pays millions of Euros in compensation every year as a result of cases before the European Court of Human Rights.

Turkey needs to get rid of the Cyprus problem if it is to meet its aspirations. Not because it loves Cypriots or is sincere, or because it wants to correct a mistake; but because a solution in Cyprus is in its interest.